by Andrew C. McCarthy January 11, 2017 3:02 PM
@AndrewCMcCarthy
The idea that FISA could be used against political enemies always seemed
far-fetched. Now it might not be.
Remember the great debate over “the Wall” following the 9/11 attacks?
“The Wall” was a set of internal guidelines that had been issued by the
Clinton Justice Department in the mid 1990s. In a nutshell, the Wall
made it legally difficult and practically impossible for agents in the
FBI’s Foreign Counter-Intelligence Division (essentially, our
domestic-security service, now known as the National Security Division)
to share intelligence with the criminal-investigation side of the FBI’s
house. Those of us who were critics of the Wall — and I was a strenuous
one, beginning in my days as a terrorism prosecutor who personally
experienced its suicidal applications — made several arguments against
it.
My favorite argument, which I have repeated countless times, centered on
how preposterous were the underlying assumptions of the Wall. This was
far easier for prosecutors than journalists, academics, and the public
to grasp, because we dealt with the Justice Department’s different
chains of command for criminal and national-security investigations.
Alas, after 20 years, I may have to revise my thinking.
The theory of the Clinton DOJ brass in imposing the Wall was the
potential that a rogue criminal investigator, lacking sufficient
evidence to obtain a traditional wiretap, would manufacture a
national-security angle in order to get a wiretap under the 1978 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). A traditional wiretap requires
evidence amounting to probable cause of commission of a crime. A FISA
wiretap requires no showing of a crime, just evidence amounting to
probable cause that the target of the wiretap is an agent of a foreign
power. (A foreign power can be another country or a foreign terrorist
organization.)
The reason the Wall theory was absurd was that a rogue agent would
surely manufacture evidence of a crime before he’d manufacture a
national-security angle. The process of getting a traditional wiretap is
straightforward: FBI crim-div agents and a district assistant U.S.
attorney (AUSA) write the supporting affidavit; it gets approved by the
AUSA’s supervisors; then it is submitted to the Justice Department’s
electronic-surveillance unit; after that unit’s approval, the attorney
general’s designee signs off; then the AUSA and the FBI present the
application to a district judge. FISA wiretaps, by contrast, go through a
completely different, more difficult and remote chain of command. In
it, the district AUSA and FBI crim-div agents who started the
investigation get cut out of the process, which is taken over by Main
Justice’s National Security Division and the FBI’s national-security
agents. In other words, if we assume an agent is inclined to be a rogue,
it would be far easier (and less likely of detection) to trump up
evidence of a crime in order to satisfy the probable-cause standard for a
traditional wiretap than to manufacture a national-security threat in
order to get a FISA wiretap. No rational rogue would do it.
But now, let’s consider the press reports — excerpted in David French’s
Corner post — that claim that the Obama Justice Department and the FBI
sought FISA warrants against Trump insiders, and potentially against
Donald Trump himself, during the last months and weeks of the
presidential campaign. It’s an interesting revelation, particularly in
light of last fall’s media consternation over “banana republic” tactics
against political adversaries, triggered by Trump’s vow to appoint a
special prosecutor to investigate serious allegations of criminal
misconduct against Hillary Clinton — consternation echoed by Senate
Democrats during Tuesday’s confirmation hearing for attorney-general
nominee Jeff Sessions.
From the three reports, from the Guardian, Heat Street, and the New York
Times, it appears the FBI had concerns about a private server in Trump
Tower that was connected to one or two Russian banks. Heat Street
describes these concerns as centering on “possible financial and banking
offenses.” I italicize the word “offenses” because it denotes crimes.
Ordinarily, when crimes are suspected, there is a criminal
investigation, not a national-security investigation.
According to the New York Times (based on FBI sources), the FBI
initially determined that the Trump Tower server did not have “any
nefarious purpose.” But then, Heat Street says, “the FBI’s
counter-intelligence arm, sources say, re-drew an earlier FISA court
request around possible financial and banking offenses related to the
server.”
Again, agents do not ordinarily draw FISA requests around possible
crimes. Possible crimes prompt applications for regular criminal
wiretaps because the objective is to prosecute any such crimes in court.
(It is rare and controversial to use FISA wiretaps in criminal
prosecutions.) FISA applications, to the contrary, are drawn around
people suspected of being operatives of a (usually hostile) foreign
power.
The Heat Street report continues:
The first [FISA] request, which, sources say, named Trump, was
denied back in June, but the second was drawn more narrowly and was
granted in October after evidence was presented of a server, possibly
related to the Trump campaign, and its alleged links to two banks; [sic]
SVB Bank and Russia’s Alfa Bank. While the Times story speaks of
metadata, sources suggest that a FISA warrant was granted to look at the
full content of emails and other related documents that may concern US
persons.
(A “US person” is a citizen or lawful permanent resident alien. Such
people normally may not be subjected to searches or electronic
eavesdropping absent probable cause of a crime; an exception is FISA,
which — to repeat — allows such investigative tactics if there is
probable cause that they are agents of a foreign power.)
Agents do not ordinarily draw FISA requests around possible crimes.
Possible crimes prompt applications for regular criminal wiretaps,
because the objective is to prosecute any such crimes in court.
Obviously, we haven’t seen the FBI affidavits (assuming they actually
exist), and we do not know lots of other relevant facts. What we have,
however, suggests that someone at the FBI initially had concerns that
banking laws were being violated, but when the Bureau looked into it,
investigators found no crimes were being committed. Rather than drop the
matter for lack of evidence of criminal offenses, the Justice
Department and FBI pursued it as a national-security investigation.
In June, an initial FISA affidavit (obviously prepared by the FBI and
the Justice Department’s National Security Division) was submitted to
the FISA court. It is said to have “named Trump” — but we don’t know
whether that means (a) his name merely came up somewhere in the text of
the affidavit or (b) he was an actual target whom the government wanted
to investigate under FISA (meaning eavesdrop, read e-mail, and the
like).
Even though the FISA standard is generally thought to be less demanding
than the traditional wiretap standard (it is easier to show that someone
may be colluding in some way with a foreign government than that he has
committed a crime), the FISA court rejected the application that “named
Trump.”
Five months later, the Justice Department and FBI submitted a second,
more “narrowly” drawn affidavit to the FISA court. The way the Heat
Street report is written intimates that Trump is not named in this
October application for FISA surveillance. The tie to Trump also appears
weak: Heat Street says the FISA court was presented with evidence of a
server “possibly related” to the Trump campaign and its “alleged links”
to two Russian banks.
To summarize, it appears there were no grounds for a criminal
investigation of banking violations against Trump. Presumably based on
the fact that the bank or banks at issue were Russian, the Justice
Department and the FBI decided to continue investigating on
national-security grounds. A FISA application in which Trump was “named”
was rejected by the FISA court as overbroad, notwithstanding that the
FISA court usually looks kindly on government surveillance requests. A
second, more narrow application, apparently not naming Trump, may have
been granted five months later; the best the media can say about it,
however, is that the server on which the application centers is
“possibly” related to the Trump campaign’s “alleged” links to two
Russian banks — under circumstances in which the FBI has previously
found no “nefarious purpose” in some (undescribed) connection between
Trump Tower and at least one Russian bank (whose connection to Putin’s
regime is not described).
More FBI
Why Was the FBI Investigating General Flynn?
Why Republicans Lose the Narrative Battle: The Inspector-General Gambit
The Media/Liberal Obsession With Conclusions
That is tissue-thin indeed. It’s a good example of why investigations
properly proceed in secret and are not publicly announced unless and
until the government is ready to put its money where its mouth is by
charging someone. It’s a good example of why FISA surveillance is done
in secret and its results are virtually never publicized — the problem
is not just the possibility of tipping off the hostile foreign power;
there is also the potential of tainting U.S. persons who may have done
nothing wrong. While it’s too early to say for sure, it may also be an
example of what I thought would never actually happen: the government
pretextually using its national-security authority to continue a
criminal investigation after determining it lacked evidence of crimes.
Read more at: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443768/obama-fisa-trump-wiretap
Read more at: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443768/obama-fisa-trump-wiretap
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