The Colorado Model
The Colorado Model
July 21, 2008 at 12:00 AM
Denver Last
January, a "confidential" memo from a Democratic political consultant
outlined an ambitious scheme for spending $11.7 million in Colorado this
year to crush Republicans. The money would come from rich liberal
donors in the state and would be spent primarily on defeating Senate
candidate Bob Schaffer ($5.1 million) and Representative Marilyn
Musgrave ($2.6 million), who are loathed by liberals for sponsoring a
proposed constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage. The overarching
aim: Lock in Democratic control of Colorado for years to come.
Leaked memos have a way of revealing who's on top and who's
not in politics and which party has energy and momentum. In Colorado,
Democrats are third in registered voters (31.2 percent), behind both
Independents (34.19 percent) and Republicans (34.14 percent). But in the
last two election cycles--2004 and 2006--they've routed Republicans,
capturing the governorship, both houses of the state legislature, a U.S.
Senate seat, and two U.S. House seats. Democrats are on a roll, and
that's not likely to change this year. Republicans are demoralized,
disorganized, and more focused on averting further losses in 2008 than
on staging a comeback.
The Democratic surge in Colorado reflects the national
trend, but it involves a great deal more. There's something unique going
on in Colorado that, if copied in other states, has the potential to
produce sweeping Democratic gains nationwide. That something is the
"Colorado Model," and it's certain to be a major topic of discussion
when Democrats convene in Denver in the last week of August for their
national convention.
While the Colorado Model isn't a secret, it hasn't drawn
much national attention either. Democrats, for now anyway, seem wary of
touting it. One reason for their reticence is that it depends partly on
wealthy liberals' spending tons of money not only on "independent
expenditures" to attack Republican office-seekers but also to create a
vast infrastructure of liberal organizations that produces an
anti-Republican, anti-conservative echo chamber in politics and the
media.
Colorado is where this model is being tested and refined.
And Republicans, even more than Democrats, say that it's working
impressively. (For Republicans, it offers an excuse for their tailspin.)
Jon Caldara, president of the Independence Institute, a conservative
think tank based in Denver, says Republicans around the country should
be alarmed by the success of the Colorado Model. "Watch out," he says,
"it's coming to a state near you."
It probably is. With enough money, its main elements can no
doubt be replicated in other states. But a large measure of political
shrewdness and opportunism is also required, political traits that have
eluded Republicans in Colorado while becoming the hallmark of their
opponents. Democrats are wisely running candidates, statewide and
locally, who campaign as centrists, not as liberals.
In 2004, in their first offensive against Republicans, the
rich liberals worked surreptitiously. They'd been brought together by Al
Yates, the former president of Colorado State University, and later
were dubbed the "Gang of Four" by the press--or, sarcastically, by
Republicans, the "Fab Four." Two of the four, Tim Gill and Rutt Bridges,
made millions in computer software. Jared Polis, along with his
parents, grew rich from building and selling Internet companies. The
fourth, Pat Stryker, is heir to a medical products fortune and runs her
family's foundation.
They quietly targeted a handful of Republican state
legislators (particularly social conservatives opposed to gay rights),
polled to find out what issues might work against them, and promoted
their Democratic opponents. Dan Haley, the editorial page editor of the
Denver Post,
told me he realized a clever, new tactic was being pursued when he
received a glossy mailer late in the campaign backing a firefighter who
was the little-known Democratic challenger of a Republican incumbent.
The firefighter had obviously not paid for the expensive piece of
campaign literature.
The firefighter lost, but other Democratic challengers won.
Republicans were flummoxed, having been caught totally by surprise. For
the first time in 44 years, Democrats gained control of both the state
senate and house. The Gang of Four had spent an estimated $2 million. In
2006, Gill and Stryker escalated their spending to $7.5 million, and
Democrats won the governor's race. "There's nobody on the Republican
side putting in that kind of money," says Republican consultant Walt
Klein.
As for the 2008 race, that confidential memo, dated January
23, fell into the hands of a Republican activist and was first reported
on January 29 by Lynn Bartels of the
Rocky Mountain News. It had
been drafted by Democratic strategist Dominic DelPapa and sent to Al
Yates, the guru of the rich liberals. They downplayed its significance,
though it memorably declared the plan would "define Schaffer/foot on
throat." At the very least the memo showed the magnitude of the effort
to drive Republicans deeper into the minority in Colorado.
And that effort draws powerful support from a liberal
infrastructure that conservatives aren't close to matching. For years,
the Independence Institute, founded in 1985 by John Andrews and headed
by Tom Tancredo before he was elected to the U.S. House, stood alone as
an influential intellectual and political force in Colorado. (Later
Andrews was Republican leader of the Colorado senate.) In 1999, Rutt
Bridges started the Bighorn Center for Public Policy, and a year later
the Bell Policy Center was created specifically to counter the
Independence Institute--prompting the institute's Caldara to quip, the
Bell center should be called the Dependence Institute.
That was only the beginning of the buildup. Eric O'Keefe,
chairman of the conservative Sam Adams Alliance in Chicago, says there
are seven "capacities" that are required to drive a successful political
strategy and keep it on offense: the capacity to generate intellectual
ammunition, to pursue investigations, to mobilize for elections, to
fight media bias, to pursue strategic litigation, to train new leaders,
and to sustain a presence in the new media. Colorado liberals have now
created institutions that possess all seven capacities. By working
together, they generate political noise and attract press coverage.
Explains Caldara, "Build an echo chamber and the media laps it up."
First, there are the think tanks such as Bighorn and Bell
and supposedly nonpartisan political advocacy groups like the Colorado
clone of
MoveOn.org called
ProgressNowAction.org, founded
in 2005. Another clone, this one a local version of Media Matters known
as Colorado Media Matters, was created two years ago to harass
journalists and editorial writers who don't push the liberal line.
There's a "public interest" law firm, Colorado Ethics Watch, established in 2006, plus an online newspaper, the
Colorado Independent,
with a team of reporters to ferret out wrongdoing by Republicans, also
begun in 2006. And there's a school to train new liberal leaders, the
Center for Progressive Leadership Colorado, as well as new media outlets
with bloggers and online news and gossip, including
ColoradoPols.com and
SquareState.net. That covers all seven capacities. Count them.
It's unclear exactly who is funding these outfits, since
they don't have to disclose their donors. But the band of rich liberals
are assumed to be the biggest contributors. And that's part of the
problem for conservatives and Republicans. They don't have a cadre of
what Caldara calls "super spenders" to tap for money, and Republicans
have lacked the gumption and foresight to build a comparable
conservative infrastructure.
To their distress, Republicans have discovered how skillful
the liberal collective is at bedeviling them. It works quite simply.
The investigative arm uncovers some alleged wrongdoing by a Republican
candidate or official or plays up what someone else has claimed. Then
Ethics Watch steps in and demands an official investigation, and
ProgressNowAction.org
jumps on the story. This is synergy at work. It spurs political
chatter. Finally, the mainstream media are forced to report on it.
Republican secretary of state Mike Coffman was hounded for months by
Colorado Confidential, now the
Colorado Independent,
for allowing a state employee to run a side business and not reporting a
supposed conflict of interest too microscopic to be worth explaining.
The mainstream media eventually picked up the story, and Colorado Ethics
Watch filed a formal complaint. Later, an official audit found no
wrongdoing, but only after Coffman had been publicly pilloried. The
episode didn't help his current campaign for a U.S. House seat.
Caldara, too, has been targeted by the liberal groups. He
used the phrase "bitch slapped" on his late-night talk radio show.
Colorado Media Matters complained, and Caldara says
ProgressNowAction.org sought to get advertisers to drop his show. "They tried to find a way to Imus me," Caldara says. He's still on the air.
Colorado, for the past half-century anyway, has not been a
solidly Republican state. "We're not a very ideological state or a very
partisan state," former Republican senator Bill Armstrong says. Colorado
voters tilt slightly to the right, though you'd never know it from
recent elections. The state was strongly affected by waves of newcomers.
Starting in the 1970s, Colorado elected Democrats Gary Hart, Tim Wirth,
and Ben Nighthorse Campbell to the Senate, Pat Schroeder to the House,
and Democrats to the governor's office for 24 consecutive years. Bill
Clinton won the state in the 1992 presidential race. So the notion the
current rise of Democrats is a historic, unprecedented
breakthrough--that's pure myth.
Republicans rallied in the 1990s when a fresh influx of
immigrants from western states arrived. They were more conservative.
Highlands Ranch, a town south of Denver, was nicknamed Orange County
East because thousands of newcomers from conservative Orange County,
California, settled there. After Campbell switched parties in 1995,
Republican Wayne Allard won the other Senate seat in 1996, and
Republican Bill Owens was elected governor in 1998, giving the GOP all
the top statewide offices, four of the six House seats, and the state
house and senate.
George W. Bush won Colorado by 9 percentage points in 2000,
and Republican control appeared to be firmly entrenched two years later
when Owens was reelected over a hapless Democrat opponent, 63 to 34
percent. Championed by
National Review as America's best
governor, Owens was viewed as a logical Republican presidential nominee
in 2008. But by 2004, the Republican heyday had begun to unravel. Owens
and his wife had a highly public separation and later divorced. And
Republicans made critical mistakes and squabbled among themselves just
as Democrats were uniting.
Two policies helped set the stage for the emergence of the
Colorado Model. Term limits, enacted in 1990, forced experienced
Republicans out of state office, leaving open seats easier for Democrats
to win. And a new campaign finance law limited individual contributions
to $400. This allowed independent TV and radio ads and direct mail
financed by the Gang of Four to have a disproportionate impact on
elections.
On many levels, 2004 was a disastrous year for Republicans
in Colorado. Bush's margin of victory was cut in half from 2000.
Democrats not only took over the legislature, but a gregarious rancher
named John Salazar, a Democrat, won the U.S. House seat west of the
Rockies, where Republicans have an overwhelming edge in voter
registration. (He was reelected in 2006.) An even bigger blow to
Republicans was the U.S. Senate victory by Salazar's younger brother,
Ken.
Owens, whose backing was critical, initially endorsed
conservative congressman Bob Schaffer for the Senate seat being vacated
by Campbell. Schaffer is a likable conservative from northern Colorado
who retired from Congress in 2004, honoring his promise to serve only
three terms in the House. Then Owens changed his mind and supported beer
company chairman Pete Coors, insisting he was the only Republican who
could beat Ken Salazar, then state attorney general. Coors defeated
Schaffer in the Republican primary, only to run a poor campaign against
Salazar.
The bitterness of the Coors-Schaffer race was in contrast
with Salazar's undisputed claim on the Democratic nomination. Democratic
congressman Mark Udall had announced for the seat the moment Campbell
said he would retire. So had Rutt Bridges. But a day later, after a
tumultuous 24 hours of negotiations, Udall and Bridges appeared at a
press conference to endorse Salazar, who ran as a moderate and an
"independent voice" for Colorado. Among Democrats, unity prevailed, and
Ken Salazar won.
In 2005, Republicans split over Referendum C, designed to
waive the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (known as TABOR) for five years.
Passed in 1992, TABOR limited spending hikes to inflation and population
growth, required any surplus to be refunded to taxpayers, and mandated a
referendum to raise taxes. Conservatives fervently opposed suspending
TABOR. But Owens and a handful of Republican leaders joined with
Democrats to pass the referendum in order to fund education and
transportation initiatives.
Things got worse for Republicans in 2006 as the Colorado
Model began to take hold. Another bitter primary, this one for governor,
pitted congressman Bob Beauprez against Marc Holtzman, the ex-president
of the University of Denver. Beauprez won the nomination, but the "Both
Ways Bob" label slapped on him by Holtzman stuck, and Democrat Bill
Ritter won the governorship in a landslide. Democrats gained legislative
seats as well.
Like Salazar, Ritter had gotten the Democratic nomination
without a struggle. This was all the more amazing because he ran as a
pro-life, pro-business Democrat. Feminists tried to find a pro-choice
Democrat to oppose him but failed. Again, unity behind one candidate
prevailed.
In 2008, Republicans are still reeling from the string of
setbacks and show few signs of recovery. One bit of progress: Schaffer
faces no serious opposition for the Republican nomination to hold the
Senate seat of Allard, who kept his promise to retire after two terms.
Schaffer is already being trashed in TV ads by an environmental group,
the League of Conservation Voters, as "Big Oil Bob." Schaffer worked for
an energy company after he left Congress.
"The bitterness of Coors-Schaffer in '04 still exists,"
says John Andrews. "The bitterness of Referendum C persists. And the
bitterness of Marc Holtzman versus Bob Beauprez in 2006 persists."
Moreover, Andrews says, "I'm not sure our party has learned the lessons
it needed to learn. Republicans and conservatives missed our moment to
be the next wave of the Reagan revolution at the state level. We didn't
seize the center, and we didn't seize the imagination of Colorado
voters."
That's a remarkable indictment of Republicans by a leading
Republican. But it strikes me as a fair assessment. Gill and Stryker,
the wealthier half of the Gang of Four, remain determined to drive
Marilyn Musgrave out of office after she narrowly won reelection in
2006. Gill, who is gay, is also active in opposing foes of gay rights in
other states.
How much they're actually willing to spend against Musgrave
and Schaffer is unclear. The leaked memo said a budget of $11.7 million
was "little more than our own thinking about what a successful
[independent] operation for the presidential, U.S. Senate and [Musgrave]
elections might look like." Republicans often trail during the summer
before the election, and Schaffer is no exception, running behind Mark
Udall in public polls. Barack Obama is a slight favorite to win Colorado
in the presidential election. If he does and also wins New Mexico,
Democratic consultant Mike Stratton points out, "Obama doesn't need to
win Ohio."
Republicans desperately need Schaffer to hold Allard's seat
to avert a filibuster-proof Senate in Washington, a Senate in which
Republicans can't block or even modify liberal legislation. Schaffer and
his campaign manager, Dick Wadhams, insist Udall is vulnerable as a
"Boulder liberal" who can't credibly pose as a moderate as Salazar and
Ritter did. Neither of them had a voting record. Salazar was state
attorney general, Ritter the Denver district attorney. "Udall doesn't
have that advantage," Schaffer says. Udall, by the way, lists his
residence as Eldorado Springs, not Boulder. Colorado voters tend to view
Boulder as a haven for hippies and out of the Colorado mainstream.
Undeterred, Udall is running to the center, saying he plays
a bipartisan role in the House. That will be news to House Republicans.
"Udall will get to where he needs to be," says Eric Sonderman, a public
relations executive in Denver. The question is whether he can
effectively respond to Schaffer's call for exploiting Colorado's vast
oil shale reserves. Schaffer's position is increasingly popular, and he
intends to dwell on it relentlessly. To propose drilling, Udall might
have to defy his wife, Maggie Fox, the state director of the Sierra
Club, the ardent environmental group. According to a former aide of Bill
Armstrong, she has the distinction of being the only person Armstrong
ever ordered to leave his Senate office. (Armstrong doesn't recall the
incident.)
Absent the Democratic headwind, Schaffer would have a
reasonable chance of winning. But his prospects could be further
hampered by an antiabortion referendum on the ballot this November
declaring that life begins at conception. If abortion becomes a major
issue, Schaffer, who is pro-life, might lose the votes of suburban
Republican women. "We don't need this," Wadhams says. In recent years,
Republican female voters have tended to stray.
Republican hopes of a renaissance rest largely on winning
the governor's race in 2010. That won't be easy. For one thing, they
lack a candidate. The Republican bench of attractive candidates with
statewide recognition is bare. The most prominent ones--Armstrong,
Owens, former senator Hank Brown--have retired. Armstrong is president
of Colorado Christian University. Aides of Allard have hinted he could
be talked into running, but that's a long shot.
In 18 months as governor, Ritter has managed to anger business, labor, and the
Denver Post,
which had promoted him as a candidate. After promising labor leaders he
would sign legislation gutting the Labor Peace Act, he bowed to
business pressure and vetoed it. The act makes it difficult for unions
to organize new workers.
Labor leaders were apoplectic. At the Gridiron Club dinner
in Washington a few weeks later, Ritter was confronted aggressively by
Teamsters president James Hoffa Jr., who told him "all of labor is
upset." Hoffa warned the Democratic convention might "blow up" if other
issues were not resolved in a way favorable to labor.
Then, late on a Friday afternoon last November, Ritter
issued an executive order permitting state workers to join a union.
Organized labor was pleased, but
Denver Post publisher William
Dean Singleton wasn't. He ordered a front-page editorial that criticized
Ritter harshly. "This may be the beginning of the end of Ritter as
governor," the editorial said. It certainly was the end of Ritter's warm
relationship with the newspaper.
For the fall ballot, Ritter is pushing a referendum to
impose a $300 million increase in the severance tax on the mining
industry, further alienating the business community. He personally
called leaders of the Metro Denver Chamber of Commerce in the faint hope
he could persuade them to back the referendum. The chamber refused.
For all his problems, Ritter will have what Republicans do
not have, if he seeks reelection: the full force of the Colorado Model
engaged on his behalf. At the same time, his Republican rival is bound
to be tormented by the phalanx of liberal groups and targeted by the
rich liberals, who are free to spend an unlimited amount of money.
"Colorado is being used as a test bed for a swarm offense
by Democrats and liberals to put conservatives and Republicans on
defense as much as possible," says Andrews. The initial results of that
test are favorable. "The wind's at our back here," says Andrew Romanoff,
the Democratic House speaker. The Colorado Model, by nearly all
accounts, is working in 2008. And it should continue to be a powerful
political force in Colorado (and other states) for many years--that is,
until conservatives and Republicans come up with a way to counteract it.