Announced Deal May Not Prevent a Nuclear Iran | MRCTV

Announced Deal May Not Prevent a Nuclear Iran

Jeff Dunetz | 16 hours ago

The deal is done. Well, kind of done. On Thursday afternoon, European and Iranian negotiators announced a political framework for an Iranian deal. The technical details of the deal will be reached by the June 30th deadline, after which the deal will begin to be executed.
According to the announcement and a follow-up by President Obama, this deal is meant to extend the time for Iran to break out to achieve a nuclear weapon from three months to one year. There are others who believe the deal doesn't prevent a nuclear Iran.
President Obama's statement in the Rose Garden declared it "a good deal":

Today, after many months of tough principle diplomacy, we have achieved the framework for that deal. It’s a good deal; a deal that meets our core objectives. This framework would cut off every pathway Iran could take to create a nuclear weapon. Iran will face strict limitations on its program. Iran has agreed to the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history. This deal is not based on trust. It's based on unprecedented verification. Many key details will be agreed to over the next few months.

Indeed, according to the fact sheet issued the White House, Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years.
Not mentioned is the fact that those 5,060 centrifuges will not give Iran the capacity to run nuclear power plants, only to create fuel for bombs (the full White House fact sheet on the terms of the deal can be found after the break below).
Other terms include the closing of some plants, conversion of others to research facilities, and letting others enrich materials other than uranium. There also are provisions for "at will" inspections

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif seemed to indicate that the deal is less restrictive than the President claimed:

IMr Zarif told reporters the agreement would show "our programme is exclusively peaceful, has always been and always will remain exclusively peaceful", while not hindering the country's pursuit of atomic energy for civilian purposes.
"Our facilities will continue," he said. "We will continue enriching, we will continue research and development." He said a planned heavy water reactor will be "modernised" and that the Iranians would keep their deeply buried underground facility at Fordo.
"We have taken a major step but are still some way away from where we want to be," Mr Zarif said, calling Thursday's preliminary step a "win-win outcome".

Perhaps, the differences between Obama's and Zarif's statements lie, not in the details of the deal itself, but in what the Iranians can still do within the parameters of deal, and the concessions the U.S. negotiators made.
For example, President Obama was saying as late as 2012: "We know they don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordo in order to have a peaceful program." But, the Iranians simply refused. So, the Americans caved and said that they could keep it open as a research facility, but they had to remove all the centrifuges for storage. This week, it emerged that the Iranians would be allowed to keep centrifuges spinning inside the mountain. But, instead of spinning uranium, the centrifuges would be spinning germanium or similar non-nuclear elements.
That's what the Administration means when it say there will be no "enrichment" going on at Fordo. Centrifuges spin isotopes into lighter and heavier elements, thereby "enriching" the material. That's what they do. There will be enrichment going on inside the Fordo, but it won't be uranium. This isn't a minor point. Since the process of enrichment is the same, no matter what is being enriched.
Iran will still have a facility inside a mountain where it will be able to research and develop new generations of centrifuges. Zarif bragged from the stage in Lausanne that Iranian R&D on centrifuges will continue on IR-4s, IR-5s, IR-6s, and IR-8s, and that the pace of research will be tied to Iranian scientific progress. The development of advanced centrifuges would give the Iranians a leg up if they decide to break out, and it will put them instantly within a screw's turn of a nuke when the deal expires.
Or, if Iranians kick out inspectors and dare the world to respond, the West will have zero way to intervene. The Iranians will have a head start on enrichment, and a place to do it beyond the reach of Western weapons. The administration's early pushback has been that the breakout time will still be a year, so it could theoretically, based on the agreement, restore the sanctions - but, it takes more than a year for sanctions to take an economic toll. And trying to sanction a Iran that is a nuclear power is a totally different matter. So, in reality, there are zero options to stop a breakout.

Another difference between Obama's outline and the Iranian foreign minister is when the sanctions will be removed. According to the President, the removal of the sanctions will occur gradually once it is verified that Iran has complied with all elements of the agreement. But, the European statement on the deal and Mohammad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, claim sanctions will be removed as each element of Iran's requirements is completed:

The EU will terminate the implementation of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions and the US will cease the application of all nuclear-related secondary economic and financial sanctions, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of its key nuclear commitments.

The Iranian foreign minister was more succinct:

In the end, the deal is still not done and there will be plenty of analysis on the political part of the deal announced today and the technical details as they emerge.

Along with ironing out what seems to be differences between the United States and the other negotiators as to what was in the agreement, the next big question is: how will Congress react? In his Rose Garden speech, the President began his pitch/warning to Congress:

In the coming days and weeks, my administration will engage Congress once again about how we can play -- about how it can play a constructive oversight role. I will begin the effort by speaking to leaders of the House and Senate today. In those conversations, I will underscore that the issues at stake here are bigger than politics. These are matters of war and peace. And they should be evaluated based on the facts and what is ultimately best for the American people and for our national. But this is not simply a deal between my administration and Iran. This is a deal between Iran, the United States of America, and the major powers in the world, including some of our closest allies. If Congress kills this deal, not based on analysis and without offering any reasonable alternative, then it is the United States that will be blamed for the failure of diplomacy. International community will collapse and the path will widen.

Below is a video of the President's Rose Garden announcement and, after the break, the details of the deal distributed by the White House.

Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

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Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.

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Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.

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Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.

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For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency

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The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.

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Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.

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Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.

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Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.

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All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.

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A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of

certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.

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Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.

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Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.

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Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.

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Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

Reactors and Reprocessing

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Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.

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The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.

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Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.

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Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.

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Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.

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Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.

Sanctions

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Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.

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U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.

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The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.

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All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).

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However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.

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A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.

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If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.

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U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Phasing

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For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.

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For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.

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Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.

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Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.

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