CHIAFALO, LEVI JENNET GUERRA, AND ESTHER VIRGINIA JOHN, PETITIONERS v. WASHINGTON ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 19–465 PETER B. CHIAFALO, LEVI JENNET GUERRA, AND ESTHER VIRGINIA JOHN, PETITIONERS v. WASHINGTON ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON [July 6, 2020] JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins asto Part II, concurring in the judgment.

3 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 1 The Court’s conclusion that the text of Article II, §1, ex-pressly grants States the power to impose substantive con-ditions or qualifications on electors is highly questionable. Its interpretation appears to strain the plain meaning ofthe text, ignore historical evidence, and give the term “Man-ner” different meanings in parallel provisions of Article Iand Article II. First, the Court’s attempt to root its analysis in Article II,§1, seems to stretch the plain meaning of the Constitution’s text. Article II, §1, provides that States shall appoint elec-tors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”At the time of the founding, the term “manner” referred toa “[f]orm” or “method.” 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of theEnglish Language (6th ed. 1785); see also 1 J. Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.1795). These definitions suggest that Article II requires state legislatures merely to set the approach for selectingPresidential electors, not to impose substantive limitationson whom may become an elector. And determining the “Manner” of appointment certainly does not include the power to impose requirements as to how the electors vote after they are appointed, which is what the Washington lawaddresses. See infra, at 8–9. Historical evidence from the founding also suggests that the “Manner” of appointment refers to the method for se-lecting electors, rather than the substantive limitations placed on the position. At the Convention, the Framers de-bated whether Presidential electors should be selected by the state legislatures or by other electors chosen by the vot-ers of each State. Oliver Ellsworth and Luther Martin, for example, thought the President should be chosen by elec-tors selected by state legislatures. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 28 (1892). Alexander Hamilton, however, pre-ferred a system in which the President would be chosen “by electors chosen by electors chosen by the people.” Ibid. The 4 CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment final language of Article II “seems to have reconciled [the]contrariety of views by leaving it to the state legislatures” to set the Manner of elector appointment. Ibid. In context, it is clear that the Framers understood “Manner” in Article II, §1, to refer to the mode of appointing electors—con-sistent with the plain meaning of the term. This understanding of “Manner” was seemingly sharedby those at the ratifying conventions. For instance, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, John Steele statedthat “[t]he power over the manner of elections [under Arti-cle I, §4] does not include that of saying who shall vote.” 4 Debates on the Constitution 71 (J. Elliot ed. 1863) (empha-sis added). Rather “the power over the manner only enables [States] to determine how these electors shall elect.” Ibid. (emphasis added and deleted). In short, the historical con-text and contemporaneous use of the term “Manner” seem to indicate that the Framers and the ratifying public bothunderstood the term in accordance with its plain meaning. Finally, the Court’s interpretation gives the same term—“Manner”—different meanings in two parallel provi-sions of the Constitution. Article I, §4, states that “[t]heTimes, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senatorsand Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” In U. S. Term Limits, the Court concluded that the term “Manner” in Article I includes only “a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations,” not “the broad power to set qualifications.” 514 U. S., at 832– 833 (majority opinion); see also id., at 861–864 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Yet, today, the Court appears to take the exactopposite view. The Court interprets the term “Manner” in Article II, §1, to include the power to impose conditionsor qualifications on the appointment of electors. Ante, at 9–10. With respect, I demur. “When seeking to discern themeaning of a word in the Constitution, there is no better dictionary than the rest of the Constitution itself.” Arizona 5 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, 829 (2015) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissent-ing); cf. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U. S. 41, 60 (2014) (KAGAN, J., for the Court) (“‘[W]ords repeated in dif-ferent parts of the same statute generally have the same meaning’” (quoting Law v. Siegel, 571 U. S. 415, 422 (2014)). While terms may not always have the exact same meaning throughout the Constitution, here we are inter-preting the same word (“Manner”) in two provisions that the Court has already stated impose “paralle[l]” duties—setting the “‘Manner of holding Elections’” and setting the “ ‘Manner’” of “‘appoint[ing] a Number of Electors.’” U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 804–805 (majority opinion).Nothing in the Constitution’s text or history indicates that the Court should take the strongly disfavored step of con-cluding that the term “Manner” has two different meanings in these closely aligned provisions.All the Court can point to in support of its position is a single sentence in Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214 (1952), whichsuggested that a State’s power to impose a requirementthat electors pledge to vote for their party’s nominee comesfrom Article II, §1, id., at 227. But this statement is simplymade in passing in response to one of the parties’ argu-ments. It is curiously bereft of reasoning or analysis of Ar-ticle II. We generally look to the text to govern our analysisrather than insouciantly follow stray, “incomplete” state-ments in our prior opinions, see Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 13).In my view, we should be guided by the text here. 2 Even accepting the Court’s broad interpretation of Clause 2 of Article II, §1, I cannot agree with its determination thatthis Clause expressly authorizes the Washington law at is-sue here. In an attempt to tie Washington’s law to the State’s “power to appoint an elector,” see ante, at 9, the 6 CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment Court construes Wash. Rev. Code §29A.56.340 (2016) as“enforc[ing] a pledge.” See ante, at 10; see also ante, at 1– 2, 7–9, 17. But §29A.56.340 did not involve the enforcement of a pledge or relate to the appointment process at all.1 It simply regulated electors’ votes, unconnected to the ap-pointment process.To understand the Court’s error, a brief summary of itstheory is necessary. According to the Court, Article II, §1, grants States “the power to appoint” Presidential electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” Ante, at 9. That “power to appoint an elector,” the Courtstates, “includes power to condition his appointment.” Ibid. The power to condition appointment in turn allows theState to insist that an “elector pledge to cast his ElectoralCollege ballot for his party’s presidential nominee.” Ante, at 9–10. And finally, “the State’s appointment power . . . enables the enforcement of a pledge.” Ante, at 10. The Court’s theory is entirely premised on the State exercising a power to appoint. Assuming the Court has correctly interpreted Article II, §1, there are certain circumstances in which this theorycould stand. Some States expressly require electors to pledge to vote for a party nominee as a condition of appoint-ment and then impose a penalty if electors violate that pledge. For example, under Oklahoma law, “[e]very partynominee for Presidential Elector shall subscribe to an oath, stating that said nominee, if elected, will cast a ballot for the persons nominated for the offices of President and VicePresident by the nominee’s party.” Okla. Stat., Tit. 26, §10– 102 (2019). Oklahoma then penalizes the violation of that oath: “Any Presidential Elector who violates his oath as a Presidential Elector shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, —————— 1In 2019, Washington revised its laws addressing Presidential elec-tors, eliminating the provision imposing a civil penalty on faithless elec-tors. See 2019 Wash. Sess. Laws pp. 755–758. 7 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of notmore than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).” §10–109(emphasis added). Other States have similar laws, first re-quiring a pledge as a condition of appointment and then pe-nalizing the violation of that pledge. See, e.g., Ind. Code §3–10–4–1.7(a) (2019) (imposing pledge requirement); §3–10–4–9(d) (stating that “[a] presidential elector who . . . pre-sents a ballot marked in violation of the presidential elec-tor’s pledge executed under section 1.7 . . . of this chapter, vacates the office of presidential elector” (emphasis added));Minn. Stat. §208.43 (2020 Cum. Supp.) (imposing pledge re-quirement); §208.46(c) (stating that “[a]n elector who . . . presents a ballot marked in violation of the elector’s pledge executed under section 208.43 . . . vacates the office of elec-tor” (emphasis added)).2 But not all States attempt to bind electors’ votes throughthe appointment process. Some States simply impose a le-gal duty that has no connection to elector appointment. See ante, at 5. For example, New Mexico imposes a legal duty on its electors: “All presidential electors shall cast their bal-lots in the electoral college for the candidates of the political party which nominated them as presidential electors.”N. M. Stat. Ann. §1–15–9(A) (Supp. 2011). And “[a]ny pres-idential elector who casts his ballot in violation of [thisduty] is guilty of a fourth degree felony.” §1–15–9(B). Cal-ifornia has a similar system. It first imposes a legal dutyon electors to vote for the nominated candidates of the po-litical party they represent if those candidates are alive.Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §6906 (West 2019). It then imposes apunishment on “[e]very person charged with the perfor-mance of any duty under any law of this state relating to elections, who willfully neglects or —————— 2See also Mont. Code Ann. §§13–25–304, 13–25–307(4) (2019); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§32–713(2), 32–714(4) (2016); Wash. Rev. Code §§29A.56.084, 29A.56.090(3) (2019). 8 CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment refuses to perform it.” §18002.3 These laws penalize elec-tors for their faithless votes. But they do not attempt toregulate the votes of electors through the appointment pro-cess. In fact, these laws have nothing to do with elector ap-pointment.The Court recognizes the distinction between these twotypes of laws, i.e., laws enforcing appointment conditionsand laws that regulate electors outside of the appointment process. See ante, at 5 (recognizing that some States“merely impose [a] duty by law”). But it claims this is merely a “small semantic differenc[e].” Ante, at 10, n. 6. Far from being semantic, the difference between the power to impose a “condition of appointment” and the power to im-pose restrictions on electors that have nothing to do with appointment is fundamental to the Court’s textual argu-ment. The Court’s entire analysis is premised on States’ purported Article II “power to appoint an elector” and “tocondition his appointment.” Ante, at 9. The Court does not, and cannot, claim that the text of Article II provides Statespower over anything other than the appointment of electors. See ante, at 9–10. Here, the challenged Washington law did not enforce any appointment condition. It provided that “[a]ny elector whovotes for a person or persons not nominated by the party of which he or she is an elector is subject to a civil penalty ofup to one thousand dollars.” Wash. Rev. Code §29A.56.340(2016). Unlike the laws of Oklahoma, Indiana, Minnesota and the other States discussed above, a violation of §29A.56.340 was not predicated on violating a pledge or any —————— 3Michigan likewise does not regulate electors through the appoint-ment process. Under Michigan law, the failure of an already appointedelector to resign “signifies” that the elector “consent[s] to serve and to cast his vote for the candidates for president and vice-president appear-ing on the Michigan ballot of the political party which nominated him.” Mich. Comp. Laws §168.47 (2008). Attempting to cast a vote for anothercandidate “constitutes a resignation from the office of elector.” Ibid. 9 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment other condition of appointment. In fact, it did not even men-tion a pledge, which was set forth in a separate, unrefer-enced provision. See §29A.56.320. Thus, §29A.56.340 had no connection to the appointment process and could be en-forced independent of the existence of any pledge require-ment. While the Court’s description of §29A.56.340 as a law enforcing a condition of appointment may be helpful for the Court’s claim that Washington’s law was rooted in Article II, §1’s “power to appoint,” it is simply not accurate. Thus, even accepting the Court’s strained reading of Article II, §1’s text, I cannot agree with the Court’s effort to reconcile Washington’s law with its desired theory. In short, the Constitution does not speak to States’ powerto require Presidential electors to vote for the candidates chosen by the people. The Court’s attempt to ground sucha power in Article II’s text falls short. Rather than contort the language of both Article II and the state statute, I would acknowledge that the Constitution simply says nothingabout the States’ power in this regard. II When the Constitution is silent, authority resides withthe States or the people. This allocation of power is both embodied in the structure of our Constitution and expressly required by the Tenth Amendment. The application of thisfundamental principle should guide our decision here. A “The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual State.” U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 846 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). When the States ratified the Federal Constitution, the people ofeach State acquiesced in the transfer of limited power to the Federal Government. They ceded only those powersgranted to the Federal Government by the Constitution. 10 CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment “The Federal Government and the States thus face differ-ent default rules: Where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power[,] the Federal Governmentlacks that power and the States enjoy it.” Id., at 848; see also United States v. Comstock, 560 U. S. 126, 159 (2010) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). This allocation of power is apparent in the structure of our Constitution. The Federal Government “is acknowl-edged by all to be one of enumerated powers.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819). “[T]he powers del-egated by the . . . Constitution to the federal governmentare few and defined,” while those that belong to the States “remain . . . numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, p. 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Article I, for example, enumerates various legislative powers in §8, but it specifically limits Congress’ authority to the “legislative Powers herein granted,” §1. States face no such constraint because the Constitution does not delineate the powers of the States. Article I, §10, contains a brief list of powersremoved from the States, but States are otherwise “free to exercise all powers that the Constitution does not withhold from them.” Comstock, supra, at 159 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).This structural principle is explicitly enshrined in the Tenth Amendment. That Amendment states that “[t]hepowers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to theStates respectively, or to the people.” As Justice Story ex-plained, “[t]his amendment is a mere affirmation of what,upon any just reasoning, is a necessary rule of interpretingthe constitution. Being an instrument of limited and enu-merated powers, it follows irresistibly, that what is not con-ferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities.” 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1900, p. 752 (1833); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 714 (1999); New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 11 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 144, 156 (1992). In other words, the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered,” United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941), “mak[ing] clear that powers reside at the state level except where the Constitution removes them from that level,” U. S. Term Limits, supra, at 848 (THOMAS, J., dis-senting); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 549 (1985).Thus, “[w]here the Constitution is silent about the exer-cise of a particular power[,] that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by necessary implica-tion,” the power is “either delegated to the state govern-ment or retained by the people.” U. S. Term Limits, supra, at 847–848 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816) (stating that the Federal Government’s powers under the Constitution must be “ex-pressly given, or given by necessary implication”). B This fundamental allocation of power applies in the con-text of the electoral college. Article II, §1, and the Twelfth Amendment address the election of the President through a body of electors. These sections of the Constitution pro-vide the Federal Government with limited powers concern-ing the election, set various requirements for the electors,and impose an affirmative obligation on States to appointelectors. Art. II, §1; Amdt. 12. Each of these directives is consistent with the general structure of the Constitutionand the principle of reserved powers. See supra, at 9–10; U. S. Term Limits, supra, at 863 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).Put simply, nothing in the text or structure of Article II and the Twelfth Amendment contradicts the fundamental dis-tribution of power preserved by the Tenth Amendment. Of course, the powers reserved to the States concerning Presidential electors cannot “be exercised in such a way as to violate express constitutional commands.” Williams v. 12 CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 (1968). That is, powers related toelectors reside with States to the extent that the Constitu-tion does not remove or restrict that power. Thus, to inval-idate a state law, there must be “something in the Federal Constitution that deprives the [States of] the power to enactsuch [a] measur[e].” U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 850 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). As the Court recognizes, nothing in the Constitution pre-vents States from requiring Presidential electors to vote for the candidate chosen by the people. Petitioners ask us to infer a constitutional right to elector independence by inter-preting the terms “appoint,” “Electors,” “vote,” and “by Bal-lot” to align with the Framers’ expectations of discretion in elector voting. But the Framers’ expectations aid our inter-pretive inquiry only to the extent that they provide evidence of the original public meaning of the Constitution. Theycannot be used to change that meaning. As the Court ex-plains, the plain meaning of the terms relied on by petition-ers do not appear to “connote independent choice.” Ante, at 11. Thus, “the original expectation[s]” of the Framers as to elector discretion provide “no reason for holding that thepower confided to the States by the Constitution has ceasedto exist.” McPherson, 146 U. S., at 36; see also ante, at 12– 13. * * * “The people of the States, from whom all governmental powers stem, have specified that all powers not prohibited to the States by the Federal Constitution are reserved ‘tothe States respectively, or to the people.’ ” U. S. Term Lim-its, supra, at 852 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Because I would decide this case based on that fundamental principle, I con-cur only in the judgment.